Andrew Mitchell: Congratulations on your election, Mr. Speaker. Your interest in international development is well known, and is very welcome.
	At the last DFID questions, the Secretary of State claimed that his Department withdrew funding to the United Nations development programme—UNDP—Afghanistan counter-narcotics trust fund as soon as serious weaknesses became apparent. However, I have obtained an internal DFID memo that reveals that the Secretary of State's predecessor was clearly warned about anticipated problems with the fund before Ministers signed off £20 million for it. Will the Secretary of State explain why Ministers ignored those warnings?

Andrew Mitchell: Let me read to the Secretary of State from the memo, which Ministers received before signing off that money. It warned that, in Afghanistan, the UNDP's reporting is "poor", and that it suffers from a "lack of experienced people" who
	"only do the minimum in terms of their contractual obligations".
	Yet, so far this year, the Secretary of State has signed off another £40 million for the UNDP in Afghanistan. Will he pledge today to launch an urgent investigation into whether UK funds have been misused, and to instigate a full review of the taxpayers' money given to the UNDP in Afghanistan?

Nicholas Clegg: I should like to add my own expressions of sympathy and condolence to the family and friends of Major Sean Birchall, who tragically lost his life in Helmand this week. I of course also join in the expressions of sympathy and condolence to the families and friends of Jason Swindlehurst and Jason Creswell. We all hope that the remaining hostages will be released safely as soon as possible.
	On the Gurkhas, the Prime Minister was wrong and was forced to back down. On MPs' expenses, he was wrong and forced to back down. On the Iraq inquiry, he was wrong and is now being forced to back down. The only gear left for this Government seems to be reverse, so when will hear from him that he is wrong too on public spending?

William Hague: I might give way to the right hon. Gentleman later, but I know that a lot of Members wish to speak.
	The committee's members are distinguished historians, commentators and public servants. We have no objection to any of them as individuals, but the composition overall still leaves a lot to be desired. Not a single member has high-level military or governmental experience. There are no former chiefs of staff and no one with experience of being in a Cabinet. Those are considerable omissions, given that much of the inquiry's scope will either be military in nature or concern the decision-making processes at the highest level of Government.
	Whatever the case against having such members, however, it cannot possibly be the one advanced by the Prime Minister in the House last week, which was wholly specious, and easily demonstrably so. His justification was that, rather than have people with political or military experience,
	"We would do better in these circumstances to draw on the professional and expert advice of people who have not been involved in commenting on this issue over the last few years."—[ Official Report, 15 June 2009; Vol. 494, c. 27.]
	In making that remark, he revealed either that he was trying to brush off the objections in this House with an argument that he knew to be bogus, or that he knew astonishingly little about the people whom he had just appointed to the inquiry.
	Of the four members of the inquiry who were originally proposed by the Government, Lawrence Freedman has written that
	"The Iraq war is rightly criticised for its flimsy rationale and incompetence of the occupation",
	and has referred at other times to the
	"inept conduct of the Iraq war, from pre-war diplomacy to post-war reconstruction".
	Martin Gilbert, a great historian, wrote in 2004 that George W. Bush and Tony Blair
	"may well, with the passage of time and the opening of the archives, join the ranks of Roosevelt and Churchill."
	Sir Roderic Lyne has not only commented on the war but was involved in the efforts to secure a second UN Security Council resolution, recalling that
	"Like other British ambassadors, I received what is now known as the 'Dodgy Dossier'",
	and referring to
	"a massive failure of British intelligence,"
	and
	"obviously a failure of political intelligence."
	Sir John Chilcot, the chairman of the inquiry, was a member of the Butler inquiry into the use of intelligence in the run-up to the war and has therefore helped to produce a whole report on one aspect of the war, let alone comment on it. All those people have commented on the war, and in some cases liberally so. In the light of that, how the Prime Minister came to think that none of the people appointed to the inquiry had commented on the Iraq war defies imagination. It is quite hard to think how he could stand up in this House and justify the exclusion of others on the basis of an argument so obviously and totally inaccurate in its very foundations.
	When the Foreign Secretary comes to reply, perhaps he will explain the answer to these questions. First, is it still the Government's considered view that it is not necessary to have on the inquiry anyone with substantial military, governmental or, indeed, legal experience? Secondly, if that is still their view, what is the real reason for that view, given that no credence whatever can be attached to the reason given last week by the Prime Minister? Thirdly, as Sir John Chilcot has tried to deal with part of the problem by having a military assessor attached to the inquiry, what possible reason is there not to have that military assessor as a full member of the inquiry? Fourthly, has the Foreign Secretary or anyone else asked Sir John Chilcot whether he would like the expertise that I have described among the inquiry's membership, and if not, why not?
	It must be clear by now that the inquiry that Ministers announced was not remotely modelled on the Franks inquiry—not in its membership, not in its terms of reference, not in the House's ability to approve the terms of reference and not in the consultation process that preceded it. The Government decided to adopt the one aspect of the Franks inquiry that suited them—that it was held in secret—and say that they had announced something like the Franks inquiry.
	The Prime Minister made much of that last week, saying that I had asked for a Franks-style inquiry, which he said
	"is what we have got."
	He also said:
	"If people on the Opposition Benches want to change their mind, it is their right to do so, but what they say is completely inconsistent".—[ Official Report, 15 June 2009; Vol. 494, c. 27-30.]
	In fact, we have never called for a secret inquiry. In one of the all too many speeches that I have given in the House on this matter, I argued in the debate two years ago not only that the membership of the inquiry should
	"draw on very senior diplomatic, military or political experience",
	but that it should be able
	"to hold some of its sessions in confidence if it needs to and to summon all the papers and persons it deems necessary."
	The Prime Minister is happy to state in this House that the Opposition had asked for a secret or private inquiry, but the fact that we had said that it should be able to hold some of its sessions in confidence hardly equates to that.
	In that same debate two years ago, hon. Members in all parts of the House were clear that the inquiry should be open. Indeed, I recall one hon. Member who was a Back Bencher at the time saying that
	"we need an inquiry that is fully in the open".—[ Official Report, 11 June 2007; Vol. 461, c. 534.]
	That was the demand of the hon. Member for Rhondda (Chris Bryant), who is now the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. I am confident that he still holds the same view, although "fully in the open" goes beyond anything that we have asked for or that the Prime Minister has countenanced. Perhaps the hon. Gentleman's views were never asked for—or perhaps they were ignored.
	The Prime Minister went on to assert that a more open inquiry would be bad for the armed forces. No sooner had he said that than he was contradicted by a mass of military figures. The Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Richard Dannatt, said that a part public, part private inquiry was an option
	"that has a lot of merit to it."
	General Sir Mike Jackson, head of the Army during the Iraq invasion, said:
	"I would have no problem at all in giving my evidence in public...The main problem with a secret inquiry...is that people would think there is something to hide."
	Air Marshal Sir John Walker, the former head of defence intelligence said:
	"There is one reason that the inquiry is being heard in private and that is to protect past and present members of this Government. There are 179 reasons why the military want the truth to be out."
	In this war of words, I think that the generals represented the Government's true motives as clearly as the Government misrepresented theirs. Nevertheless, armed with those completely inaccurate assertions about the views of the Opposition and the military, the Prime Minister was insistent at the beginning of last week that the whole inquiry would be held in private. That was on Monday. On Tuesday, we tabled the motion now before the House, and many Government Members indicated that they agreed with it. On Wednesday, the Prime Minister suddenly wrote to Sir John Chilcot asking that
	"those appearing before the inquiry do so with the greatest possible candour and openness"
	and asking him to explain how the inquiry would be conducted. By Monday of this week, Sir John had given the more satisfying reply to which I have referred.
	So when the Prime Minister was asked, during a limited consultation, to ensure that the inquiry was open whenever possible, he chose to ignore those requests. However, when faced with the possibility of a difficult vote in his House, he changed within hours the approach that he had been insistent on, but chose to do so not by coming to the House and saying that he had modified his proposals, but by setting up an exchange of letters with Sir John, without any announcement to the House.
	One of the purposes of this debate is to allow Ministers to explain to the House their understanding of an inquiry that we are pleased will now be carried out on a substantially different basis from the one on which they were insistent only nine days ago. The policy on secrecy has been changed. The lack of military expertise has started to be addressed, but has not been fully addressed. The chairman of the inquiry has begun a process of consultation, suggesting that more changes could be on the way, as they should be.
	An inquiry that is seriously overdue cannot even get off to a clean start, but will spend an unspecified period of time adjusting its remit—a recipe for confusion, rather than clarity. We appreciate the efforts of Sir John Chilcot to make up for the deficiencies in the initial announcement, but the Government's handling of the issue means that, as things currently stand, the inquiry will start its work with far less credibility in the eyes of the public or Parliament than it should have had.
	In addition to answering the questions that I asked earlier, let the Foreign Secretary now assist the inquiry, the House and the country by being clear about the following matters. Is it now the view of Ministers, as well as of Sir John Chilcot, that the evidence put to the inquiry should be heard in public whenever possible, and will the Foreign Secretary confirm that to the House? Will he explain the true reason why the Government were opposed to such a position until days ago, given that the reasons put to the House by the Prime Minister were not credible ones? Will he confirm that it is the Government's view that the desirability of holding sessions in public whenever possible applies as much to the inquiry's forthcoming sessions with Mr. Tony Blair, Mr. Alastair Campbell and the Prime Minister as to anyone else? Will he also confirm that the inquiry will indeed be free to issue an interim report at any stage of its work, if it wishes to do so? Is he happy that a way can be found of giving evidence on oath or some equivalent to it? Will he confirm that the inquiry will have access to all relevant records of meetings and dealings between the British and American Governments?
	Finally, will the Foreign Secretary apologise on behalf of the Government for the monumental mess that has been made of what should have been a straightforward process of consultation and consensus? Will he also undertake that the Government will provide to the House the honesty about their own processes, the accuracy about the statements of others, the clarity about the operation of the inquiry and the efficiency in the whole conduct of this business, which this Government, from the Prime Minister down, have so far been unable to supply?

David Heath: The hon. Gentleman is right. In both America and other European countries, there have not apparently been the obstacles that the British Government believe were in place to an open and independent. Also, historically, a number of examples of inquiries were held while hostilities were still taking place and they were faced with no apparent obstacle to their progress.
	We finally reached the end of this stonewalling period, however, and the Prime Minister came to the House on 16 June to announce the terms of the inquiry. I think it is fair to say that Members in all parts of the House were less than impressed with what they heard from him, because he seemed at pains to stress—almost over any other consideration—how little of the inquiry would be held in public.

David Heath: Yes, as my hon. Friend says, he does not do that here. He just allows it to be known that the Government have changed their position. Well that is not good enough and, in this instance, it puts Sir John Chilcot in the almost impossible situation of having to undertake an exercise in post facto consultation and then to derive different terms of reference for the inquiry from those that were set out by the Prime Minister.
	One of the difficulties that the Prime Minister has had is what he said, categorically, in response to my right hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr. Clegg):
	"We also have to take into account what serving officers will want to say to the inquiry. I think that...all those things involve a degree of confidentiality that would not suit a public inquiry".—[ Official Report, 15 June 2009; Vol. 494, c. 29.]
	That bold assertion lasted barely 24 hours before senior members of the military said what nonsense it was. I am pleased that the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks quoted Air Marshal Sir John Walker, the former head of defence intelligence, because his comment was powerful and chilling in its clarity. He said:
	"There is one reason that the inquiry is being heard in private and that is to protect past and present members of this Government. There are 179 reasons why the military want the truth to be out."
	Those are 179 good reasons, and one might add that there are several hundred thousand other good reasons in the state of Iraq.

David Heath: The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. I am delighted to say to him that if he is in the House on 7 July, he will hear that a ten-minute Bill in my name, the parliamentary commissions of inquiry Bill, will be introduced that restores the right of the House to do exactly what the hon. Gentleman's Committee has recommended—that is, to be able to set up parliamentary commissions of inquiry independent of the Executive. That is exactly what this House should have the power to do.
	It surely cannot be right for witnesses to limit their preparedness to provide evidence. That means that someone cannot breeze in and say to the inquiry, "Right, I've got an hour and then I'm off to Dusseldorf. I'm sorry, but that's what you've got, so please ask your questions and then I will be on my way." Frankly, we have seen that happen when people have appeared before Select Committees and it must not happen before an inquiry.
	As has already been said, the inquiry has an enormous remit and it breaks down into various parts. I welcome the fact that it has a large remit, but I do not welcome the almost interminable delay in producing any response that might be occasioned by the size of the remit. It is important that we therefore have phasing—I do not why the Foreign Secretary finds this amusing. It is quite clear that conduct before the war is quite different from the conduct of the war, which is quite different from the peacebuilding operation. It is perfectly proper for the inquiry to consider those matters separately and in turn and to produce interim reports. I see absolutely no reason why, in the first instance, it should not consider the matters that preceded the involvement of the United Kingdom in this conflict and report on that. It does not need to take a huge amount of time from now for that to happen. I strongly commend to the inquiry that it phases its work in such a way. If we can assist by giving an indication from this House that that would be our preference, I think that we should.
	The Iraq war was, in the view of many of us, a quite massive failure of British foreign policy that was aided and abetted by those on both sides of the House who were not prepared, perhaps, to consider the evidence with sufficient assiduity. It is essential that we form a view, that we learn from experience and that we provide the truth, as far as we can, by means of this inquiry. That will help all those who have enormous concern about the conduct of the war—they expressed it at the time and have expressed it since—all those who have been involved through the military and who have seen at first hand the difficulties, and all those who wanted the rebuilding of Iraq to take place with greater coherence of strategy and policy than was the case.
	Until we have a proper open, transparent, rigorous public inquiry into these matters, those lessons will not be learned. That is why I will recommend that my right hon. and hon. Friends support the motion tabled in the name of the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks. I hope that the House will speak clearly on this matter, because I do not believe that the Government will not take acquiescence with their proposed amendment today as approbation for the inquiry that they seek. I do not believe that the matter will come back to the House again on a Government motion. I believe that this is the last time that we will have the opportunity to speak on it and we must make our voices heard.

Tony Wright: Following that injunction, I think that we should all try not to revisit the substantive arguments about the Iraq war, on which we all took vigorous and divergent positions. For myself, I anticipated that I would support the Iraq war. I was a great admirer of the former Prime Minister—as, indeed, I am a great admirer of the current Prime Minister, and as I will be of any future Prime Minister from the Labour Benches—but I was also taken with the courage of his devotion to the cause of liberal interventionism and of trying to do good against evil in the world.
	I was therefore in the market for military adventure, but the problem was that I could not follow the logic of the argument. I am sure that many others shared that problem. When we talk about the inquiry, the central and abiding questions that it has to engage with are as follows: how did we get from 9/11 to March 2003? How did we get from the twin towers to the invasion of Iraq? What was the policy narrative that took us from one to the other?
	Everyone has constructed their own narratives about these events, some of which will remain forever unverified. For example, I think that we shall never know about the legality of what was done. The nature of international law is such that we shall never come to a settled view on that. We can discover more about the process by which the Government took legal advice and so on, but I do not think that we will ever settle central questions of that kind. However, I do think that what we will be able to discover will enable us to understand far better the policy process that took us from 9/11 to the Iraq war. Further questions involve what happened after the invasion, and why we had so much trouble managing the peace in the years that followed.
	The inquiry needs to tell us all that because, as has been said, public confidence in our governing process has no chance of being restored unless we can find a narrative that people can test. They need to feel that the process has at least been properly interrogated and examined, and an inquiry is absolutely essential for that purpose.
	One of the difficulties with what the Government announced was that they seemed not to understand that that would be a central purpose of the inquiry. It is, of course, absolutely pivotal that we learn all the lessons, and the Government were right in the way that they established the scope of the inquiry and its extensive period. However, to think that the inquiry would be just about learning lessons—important though that is—is to fail to understand what its several purposes have to be.
	Inquiries always have several purposes, but a major purpose of this inquiry must be the one that I am describing—to get inside the policy process so that we can begin to answer the questions that still hang in the air and so contaminate people's trust in that process. Without wanting to insert my own narrative into the events, I believe that an inquiry therefore has to be a huge process of decontamination, as it were, of the decline in trust occasioned by what happened.
	As I said in an earlier intervention, we are in much better place now than we were just a few days ago. If I may say so, I did not feel that my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary's heart and mind were fully engaged by what he was telling us today. I think that I have known him well enough and long enough to know when his heart and mind are fully engaged in what he is saying. I think that he had to say what he said but, if I may say so, I do not think that he quite believed it.
	The truth is—and we need to be truthful, as this is a big issue—that what has happened is an object lesson in how not to set up an inquiry. I do not say that with any pleasure, but it is simply the fact of the matter. The terms of the Opposition motion are entirely right, and the only thing that would constrain me from voting for it is the certain shamelessness on their part in putting it forward.
	With his usual ingenuity, the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague) sought to explain what his party really wanted when it called repeatedly for a Franks-style inquiry. That, of course, was a private, Privy Counsellor, inquiry, but the right hon. Gentleman said that that was not what he actually meant and that what the Opposition really wanted was all kinds of other things.
	If I was confused by that, I am not surprised that my right hon. Friend Prime Minister was too—or that he might have thought that he was giving the Opposition what they had asked for. The Opposition, realising that a different political moment has arrived, now pop up and say that they were in favour of a public inquiry all along, but that is simply not the case.

Michael Ancram: I am grateful to be called, Mr. Deputy Speaker. I shall be brief, as many of the points I wished to raise have already been made, as is the nature of such debates.
	It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright). I listened to him with great care, but he was wrong on one point, when he said that he had not heard that we had been calling for sometime for a judicial inquiry. In fact, the right hon. and learned Member for North-East Fife (Sir Menzies Campbell) moved a motion on 4 June 2003, calling for such an inquiry, and I supported him on it. I moved a motion on 16 July 2003 and again on 23 October 2003, each of which called for a judicial inquiry where the proper rules of evidence could be applied. It was on that latter occasion when the then Foreign Secretary said, "No, we cannot have one; it will take too long, and it will go over the election so the people will not be able to make a judgment". We also had a running motion on the Order Paper on every sitting day between July and October. We made our position quite clear—we wanted an open and comprehensive inquiry.
	If I may say so from the outset, I am a great respecter and admirer of Sir John Chilcot, who was permanent secretary in the Northern Ireland Office when I served there. I think he has tremendous ability, but we must not ask him to do the impossible. In some ways, by leaving the remit as vague and open as it is now, we are in danger of doing so.
	I want to see an inquiry that, after six years and despite those earlier calls, will finally bring closure to the issue of Iraq. We started to call for an inquiry so early not just because of the fog of war, but because of the fog of the nature of the evidence, which meant that there were disputes, disagreements and controversies about the actual truth. Although I and my party—or most of it—voted for the war, I felt that it was essential for the British people to understand what had happened. One way or the other—whether I was right or those who argued against me were right—the British people had a right to know. That is why it is so important that, on this occasion, we get this inquiry right. If we end up with another inquiry that leaves disagreements, doubts, confusion and upset, we will not have served the British people as I believe that we should.

Gavin Strang: Yes, I think that there is a consensus there.
	The Government amendment makes explicit reference to the families, where it says
	"recognises the importance of allowing the families of those who gave their lives in Iraq to express their views about the nature and procedures of the inquiry".
	That is fine. Families, and the organisations that represent them, are hugely important. Let us not have any doubt about the scale of the opposition to this intervention among the military. There is no question about that. People working at the Ministry of Defence demonstrated outside this place during our debates at the time. There was huge opposition in all the military services to the decision to send our troops to Iraq. I hope that in the inquiry we do justice to the families and their organisations, including Military Families Against the War.
	I have listened to the Opposition members who have spoken with interest. The Opposition propose that the remit of the inquiry be broadened so that it goes back to 2001, and we welcome that, but I hope that there is not the slightest suggestion that the intervention in Iraq had some logistical follow-on from 9/11. The al-Qaeda presence was virtually non-existent. I say that as someone who had the privilege of serving on the Intelligence and Security Committee when the previous Prime Minister, Tony Blair, asked it to look into that issue, so I will not make too much of it. We know what happened: the US and the whole of the west looked strong after 9/11. It is a hard thing to say, but there was a sort of glow and invading Iraq destroyed all that. It was a huge boost to al-Qaeda and other forces.
	That is enough of the substance; I shall return to some of the points raised by the party leaders, who will obviously be important in the inquiry process. We certainly support the involvement of the military assessors. Obviously, all the services are heavily involved and it is important that they are consulted. We should pay tribute to the military; all the services fought for their country and anyone who dies for their country—no matter how they die—should be treated with respect and as a hero.
	The committee membership is a bit small, however. There are a couple of historians. I have no problems about the inclusion of two historians—I was a scientist, but I recognise how important history is in determining where we are politically. We could even put another historian on the inquiry.
	The shadow Foreign Secretary mentioned that the official Opposition had managed to gain an addition to the membership after their dialogue with the Government, and that a woman would be added to the list. Obviously, I support in principle the addition of a woman—a member of the other place. I have no doubt that Baroness Prashar will be a diligent member of the committee, but who does she represent? She is the parliamentarian. Were the official Opposition consulted about the parliamentarian on the inquiry? Was there a deal only in terms of the sex of the person who would represent the British Parliament? Baroness Prashar will certainly not represent the House of Commons, so that issue is of interest. What is the position of parliamentarians in relation to the inquiry?

Malcolm Rifkind: I am not entirely convinced that Sir John Chilcot has changed his mind. I have no doubt that, as the chair of the inquiry, he had to accept what the democratically elected Government of the day decided.
	I turn to the question of composition. I agreed with what the right hon. Member for Edinburgh, East (Dr. Strang) said. I have nothing against Baroness Prashar and I am sure that she is an impressive lady in her field. However, no one with military experience will sit on the committee, although the whole purpose of the inquiry is to examine a war and the provision made for fighting it successfully. Baroness Prashar's biographical details—chairman of the Judicial Appointment Commission, chairman of the Parole Board for England and Wales and director of the National Council for Voluntary Organisations—are no doubt those of an impressive person, but they are not remotely comparable to those of a former Chief of the General Staff or First Sea Lord, or a person with military skills.
	All the Government have been able to say, even when they began their retreat, is that assessors will be available to assist the committee. However, we have not heard why, in the Government's view, it is inappropriate for someone with senior, serious military experience to sit on a committee that is examining what happened in the run-up to a war, during that war and in its aftermath. It is disgraceful that the Government have not only failed in that respect, but have not even provided an explanation to the House. Although the Minister for the Armed Forces might not have the authority to do so, I ask him to ensure that the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary examine the matter again, because if the inquiry is to carry credibility with the armed forces, which is as important as its credibility with any other sector of the community, it is crucial that they are represented on the committee.
	My final point relates to the question of blame. The Prime Minister's original statement was quite clear:
	"The committee will not set out to apportion blame".—[ Official Report, 15 June 2009; Vol. 494, c. 24.]
	His clear intent was that the committee should reach conclusions on the facts and make statements about what happened, but not criticise Ministers, officials or anyone else involved. I welcome the fact that the Foreign Secretary set out today, at the Dispatch Box, that that is no longer the Government's position. The Government know that they could not sustain such an intolerable position. A lot of reference has been made to the Franks committee, but that was not so constrained, because it was for the committee to decide whether to criticise the Government. It concluded that it should not, but that was its decision, not one that had been imposed on it. It is highly desirable that such a situation should apply now. I cannot recall the number of occasions on which Tony Blair said, "I accept full responsibility for the war", which implied a major concession, but then went on to defend everything that he had done. Let us see whether he was entitled to do that. If the committee takes the view that he was not, it would be improper to prevent it from expressing that judgment.
	The Government have moved on a number of important issues, but each time they have done so grudgingly and unconvincingly, while giving explanations that do not hold water. As several hon. Members have said, the process has been carried out not through statements to the house, but through the entirely artificial device of letters between the Prime Minister and the chairman of the committee.
	I am conscious that many hon. Members wish to speak, so I shall conclude by reminding the House of a statement made by Edmund Burke in 1780:
	"If there is one eminent criterion which above all the rest distinguishes a wise government from an administration weak and improvident, it is this—'Well to know the best time and manner of yielding what it is impossible to keep.'"
	The Government, by both their timing and manner, show that they have a lot to learn from the wise remarks of Mr. Burke.

Robert Marshall-Andrews: My good and hon. Friend shakes his head when I say that, but let us have an inquiry to find out, and then, at least, something that has passed between he and I will be laid to rest. It is we who were misled, if we were misled, and it is to us that the inquiry must answer and it is to us to set the terms of reference of that committee. The terms of reference are not in themselves a matter of deep jurisprudence, because they are perfectly simple: the inquiry should be open; on oath and without immunity. What is more, those against whom criticism or indictment may be made must be warned of that fact and must be represented—yes—when they give evidence before the committee.
	None of that is difficult to understand; it was all enshrined in the committees that were set up under Lord Salmon and The Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921, which, as my hon. Friend the Member for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright) pointed out, was the point at which we divested ourselves of such authority. Now, we must retain it and we must regain it. That is one reason why, if the House divides, I shall be on the Opposition side, not because I wish to vote with the Tories, but because I wish to vote for—for—an inquiry in the terms that we require it.

Paul Flynn: We all remember well the day of the vote itself. To their great credit, six Conservative Members voted against their three-line Whip; on the Labour side, 139 Members voted against a very tough three-line Whip. However, as has been recorded in a book by Philip Cowley, 80 other Members had already signed early-day motions or other motions against the war, but they were bullied, bamboozled and bribed into voting the other way or abstaining. If they had been told the truth on the 45-minute threat and the deceptions in the two dossiers, they almost certainly would not have voted with the Government. Many of them bitterly regret their votes now.
	Those Members, and Parliament, deserve the truth. We can get at the truth if the inquiry is divided into two tiers. The other, long inquiry into what happened for years before and years afterwards can go on. We should also have an inquiry that focuses not on whether the war was going to take place—it was going to happen anyway—but on why Britain was a collaborator in Bush's war. Why were we involved?
	To his great credit, Harold Wilson kept us out of the Vietnam war. We should have used our opportunity and voted for non-involvement in the Iraq war; if we had, those 179 brave British soldiers would not have lost their lives. The Public Administration Committee believes that the crucial issue of why we were involved should be considered first. Such an inquiry could be conducted in a matter of a few months. As we on the Committee put it,
	"We recommend that consideration be given to splitting the inquiry into two stages: the first stage to concentrate on the British decision to go to war; and the second stage to consider the broader lessons from the conflict and its aftermath."
	The other point, made by my hon. Friend the Member for Cannock Chase (Dr. Wright) this afternoon and not answered by a Front Bencher, is whether the issue ends today. Will a vote for the Government amendment be interpreted as approval by Labour Members of the idea that the matter is over? Will it mean that we do not have to look at the decisions taken on the shape of the inquiry and that we abandon our rights as parliamentarians to decide on how the inquiry should go forward?
	I accept what Government Front Benchers have said about the element of bandwagonism on the part of the official Opposition. They are trying to score political points, and I am reluctant to vote with them for that reason. I think, however, that I will do so because otherwise I would have to give full approval for how the Government introduced the idea of the inquiry and for how they are mishandling the issue now by trying to put Labour Members into an arm lock and make them agree to something to which we do not agree. We want another look at the issue. We want a substantive motion before the House, another debate and a chance to decide; as the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green said, we decide on so little.
	The two worst decisions that this country has made in my lifetime have been to do with the Suez crisis and the war in Iraq. However, we made an awful mistake—without there having been a Division on the matter—in deciding to send troops in a surge into Helmand province. We had a debate on the subject, but in Westminster Hall. At the time, only seven soldiers had been killed in Afghanistan. As a result of the surge, there was also a surge in casualties; now not seven but 169 soldiers have died, and the number is increasing every week as part of a war that is going nowhere.
	During the brief debate, the futility of the decision to go into Helmand province was compared to that of the charge of the Light Brigade. Now more soldiers have died in Helmand than died in the charge of the Light Brigade. Surely we need to debate that issue as parliamentarians. Surely we need to say that, in respect of future and current conflicts, Parliament should assert itself. We should cry out, "For goodness' sake, can you justify this war? Can you justify a future conflict, possibly led by America, against Iran or wherever else?" Obama is now President of the United States, so there is hope that good things will come. The man is an intellectual, far removed from his predecessor. I believe that he has great ideals and a clear vision of world events. It is hoped that the rest of the western world will follow in the slipstream of the path that he is taking.
	This week, we parliamentarians have heard a lot about the weakness of our position. The decision that we took in March 2003 haunts many Members here now. We will make decisions in the future, but we have to make them in a way that reflects the views of our constituents. There is talk of this inquiry being similar to the Franks inquiry. Despite the problems of the Belgrano, that inquiry was into a war that generally united the nation; the nation was generally behind the Falklands war. The Iraq war, however, bitterly divided the nation, probably as no war has in our history—no previous war brought out 2 million people on to the streets.
	We saw a deluded Government, led by people who almost certainly had done a deal with the American President to go ahead with the war. As has been said, they decided to fit the facts around the policy. That was the position that we were in. We have only to look at the two dossiers to read the exaggerations, lies and mistakes. As a Parliament, we were fooled by those dossiers and the Front-Bench speeches. The issue must be fully investigated and illuminated, and that must happen rapidly.

David Davis: I commend my right hon. Friend on making an astonishingly informative speech. To reinforce his comment about politicians being involved, everything that he has described is mirrored in similar failures—constitutional, structural, governmental and decision-making failures—in the United States. They have come out recently because of the torture issue and how legality was bypassed, so it is doubly important that politicians should be involved.

Clare Short: I cannot confirm that date, but I can confirm that when I heard the rumour—but did not see the legal document—that the Attorney-General doubted the legality of the war, I warned my staff of the consequences of that, which I think was entirely proper. That is part of the shame of it all, but I shall come on to the preparations. There were preparations that were then all junked, because of the hubris and deceit that went into preparing for war.
	I believe that a proper examination of the untruths, the constitutional manipulation and the outcome must lead to a re-examination of the UK's role in the world. That is a very important consequence of the inquiry that needs to flow to the House of Commons. I do not advocate hostility to the United States, of course. Indeed, I think that if we had spoken truthfully to the United States at the time, we would have been a better friend. I yearn, however, for an honest appraisal of the dangers the world and the UK face and an intelligent discussion of the contribution we could make, working with others, to the establishment of a more equitable and just world order, capable of dealing with the disorder that will come to us because of climate change. It is also my view that if we do not do better in bringing justice to the middle east, the capacity of the international system to co-operate to deal with these challenges will be broken and weakened, with desperately serious consequences for all of us.
	We need an inquiry that forces all parties and the public to face up to the fact that we got involved in Iraq because George Bush and the neo-conservatives wanted to overthrow the unpopular regime of Saddam Hussein—regime change—and establish a friendly power in Iraq, so that they could relocate American bases in the middle east, dominate the Gulf and have close relations with a country that contained a large proportion of the world's remaining oil. As has been said, all of that is laid out for all to read in the documents published by the Project for the New American Century, which many of those who became senior figures in the Bush Administration had signed up to.
	Of course, the US expected the invasion of Iraq to be popular with Iraqis and therefore thought that it would help to stabilise the middle east. The only problem was that international law, laid down after the second world war under the leadership of President Roosevelt and with the support of Prime Minister Churchill, did not permit that, and thus the lying became necessary in order to do what the neo-conservatives thought to be right.
	I did not know that Tony Blair had the published documents of the Project for the New American Century drawn to his attention—they were certainly not drawn to the attention of the Cabinet—but I think that he was desperate to be close to George Bush and worried that he would not be because of the closeness of his relationship with President Clinton, and that he therefore gave his word early on that Britain would be with him in the planned invasion of Iraq. From that, it all flows: the exaggeration of the threat from weapons of mass destruction to give an excuse for war, because regime change is not legal.
	The Butler report and the various leaks from our intelligence agencies have shown that the intelligence was being fixed around the policy. Hans Blix started out believing that there were WMD in Iraq, but when he found and reported that there were not—he reported to the Security Council what he had found, and also achieved the dismantling of large numbers of ballistic missiles—he was briefed against and smeared because his truthful findings were obstructing the excuse for war.
	In the matter of international law, the neo-conservatives had no concern. They repeatedly made clear their profound disrespect for the United Nations and the constraints of international law. They wanted to keep the UK with them because the majority of US citizens said yes to war in coalition, but not alone. The UK had to pretend to respect international law, and that led to the game that was played at the United Nations. We should all remember that the UK ambassador to the UN, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, whom I like and admire enormously, gave a shameful undertaking on behalf of the UK when the first resolution was passed that there was no automaticity—no authority for war—without another resolution. However, the UK went on to argue later that the first resolution gave authority for war. That was deeply shameful.
	—
	I remain deeply shaken by the way in which the interpretation of international law was manipulated to fit the policy. The first legal opinion, which was leaked and is now a matter of public record, was kept from the Cabinet. That was a complete breach of the ministerial code, but who enforces the code? It is the Prime Minister. The second legal opinion was concocted at the last minute by an Attorney-General who was a crony of the Prime Minister, put into the Lords by the Prime Minister and made Attorney-General by the Prime Minister.

Gordon Prentice: My views will not be changed by the Minister's big, broad smile, but I want to say something about documents. I attended a meeting a week or 10 days ago that was addressed by Philippe Sands the human rights QC. He spoke about a note from President Bush to the former Prime Minister Tony Blair on 31 January 2003. President Bush allegedly said, "Put up the planes; fly the planes over Iraq; paint them in UN colours, and when Saddam shoots them down, that's the pretext to go to war." I do not know whether that is fantasy land, or even whether that document really exists, but the inquiry should be able to subpoena all the documents, if that is the expression, it needs to get to the truth.
	Let me restate my central point. I want the Government to concede and to bring forward a substantive motion allowing the House to consider the new terms of reference and the composition or membership—call it what you will—so that the House can vote on it and give the inquiry its parliamentary imprimatur. If I do not get that, I will vote with the Conservatives.

Barry Gardiner: Does the hon. Gentleman recall the words of resolution 1441, which includes the words:
	"Determined to secure full compliance with its decisions,
	Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations... Decides that Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687"?
	Chapter VII, of course, is the only chapter of the UN charter that justifies the use of force.

Greg Mulholland: The hon. Gentleman shows how out of touch with the public he remains. That is also what the Government have achieved with their bungling of the attempt to introduce a half-baked inquiry into Iraq. We all know that it was introduced only as a sop to Labour Back Benchers to try to save the Prime Minister's political life a few weeks ago. Close scrutiny shows that, once again, the Prime Minister has taken his blunderbuss and shot himself in both feet.
	We now have an inquiry that will not even have the power to summon witnesses before it, and witnesses will not necessarily be speaking under oath. After everything that has already come out about this sorry affair, how can the public possibly trust witnesses who are not speaking under oath? The members of the inquiry team will be hand-picked by the Government from establishment figures. Yes, this House is right to be concerned that we will not have a say in who the members should be. We should be far more concerned, however, that general public should find the members credible. The general public must believe that the committee is credible, or it is not even worth starting the exercise.
	Of course, I shall support the Opposition motion; however, I have to disagree with something that the right hon. Member for Richmond, Yorks (Mr. Hague) said. He said that this is not about who was right and who was wrong. I am afraid that it is. It is time for all those who voted for the war to admit that they were wrong. That is patently obvious.
	I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Glasgow, Central (Mr. Sarwar), who has acknowledged that he made a mistake. It would be interesting to get a list of all those who voted for the war who have now had the courage to say that they were wrong, for whatever reason, and that they regret that decision. It is certainly a decision that they should regret.
	The wording of the Government amendment is interesting. It says that we wish to
	"establish the lessons to be learnt".
	Surely the main lesson is not to manipulate and misrepresent intelligence to justify sending British soldiers into an illegal war that is to be waged by America. We do not need an inquiry to tell us that. However, we do need an inquiry to tell us how and why that disastrous decision was ever reached and to find out whether the House was deliberately misled.
	I share the concerns that have been expressed about extending the remit of the committee. We must consider what happened afterwards, but we must first get closure for this country on why we went into the war in the first place. I echo the comments made by the hon. Member for Nottingham, South (Alan Simpson), who talked about punishment. We are now talking about having a one-year jail sentence for Members who abuse their expenses. What punishment should we have for a Prime Minister who deliberately misled the House of Commons and the British public into an illegal and immoral war? That is a question that we should be asking as part of the process. We simply cannot hide from it.
	I am sure that we have all seen the ghost of Tony Blair over the past week. We still see his hand on the shoulder of the current Prime Minister. The sad reality is that although George W. Bush is discredited and did not get away with the illegal invasion of Iraq, as usual, "Teflon Tony" did. The only way to change that is to get him in front of a public inquiry, under oath, and finally get to the bottom of that decision.
	If anyone doubts what I have said, the former Prime Minister, at the same Dispatch Box from which he misled the people of this country, once said something that was entirely untrue about me. He never had the decency or honour to apologise for that. What hope do we have that he will ever apologise for his disastrous decision?
	There is a lot of talk about whether Tony Blair influenced the decision to have the inquiry held in private. I think that just about everyone on the Government Benches realises that that has done them a great deal of damage. Frankly, it does not matter, because Tony Blair's legacy is that it does not matter what the truth is, but simply how it is presented. Let me quote a supporter of the war, Bruce Anderson, from  The Independent on 22 June. He said:
	"Especially in Britain, policy towards Iraq was founded on a lie, because the Prime Minister could not admit his real...motive: regime change."
	That quotation comes from someone who supported the decision to go into war. The reality, however, is that the current Prime Minister took part in that decision. In May 2007, he said
	"I take my responsibility as a member of the Cabinet for the collective decisions that we made, and I believe that they were the right decisions".
	The reality is that millions of people in this country do not believe that the decisions were right, but they do believe that we have the right to find out exactly why they were taken.
	The expenses scandal of the past few weeks has brought this House into disrepute. The decision to take this country into an illegal and immoral war brought the Government into disrepute. If we are to restore public confidence in the House and the Government, we need a proper inquiry and not the half-baked one that the Government are trying to get away with. We need a genuine inquiry that will finally give the answers needed to put this sorry issue to rest and to restore credibility in this House and this Government.
	The people who marched in February 2003, some of whom had never marched before, deserve a proper inquiry. The fallen soldiers and their families must have that. If we want to restore faith in our democracy, we must demand it. If the biggest foreign policy mistake since Suez does not warrant a public inquiry, what does? This House failed the nation in 2003. It must not do so again this evening.

Andrew MacKinlay: I am one of those who voted for the conflict. I have told the House before that I shall deeply regret that until the day that I die. I believe that I was hoodwinked. I also think that my judgments were unsound.
	I remember that we all went through a crisis at the time, as we examined whether it was a just war. We looked into what Thomas Aquinas said and we tried to understand the international law, but the background was that a British Prime Minister came to the House and told us that there was an immediate and serious threat. That certainly influenced me, and perhaps I will be able to amplify on that on another occasion.
	The House and the nation were misled, and I am angry at having been fooled and at the way that I was bounced into voting for the war. I am bewildered by how anyone could consider not voting for the Opposition motion before the House this evening, because it sums up what must be done. It says that there should be an independent inquiry, and that there should be a resolution of the House of Commons to confirm its terms of appointment and its membership. The Prime Minister keeps going on about rejuvenating Parliament and constitutional reform. That is one reason why he should embrace the motion, but I shall refer to another in a moment.
	The Government amendment makes me very angry. At last Wednesday's Prime Minister's Question Time, I cautioned the Prime Minister that I wanted to know whether people would give evidence under oath. Until the past few hours, there was no great response or interest from Members of Parliament or the press. Even some very good Members of Parliament from all parties still did not seem to understand that no one will be able to give evidence under oath because it is not a statutory inquiry. The amendment says that the Government will
	"consult party leaders...on the scope for taking evidence under oath"
	but I know, and the Prime Minister knows, that that is complete nonsense. The only way to get evidence given under oath is by the House passing a swift Act of Parliament to facilitate an extraordinary, one-off inquiry. I think that I am only person in the House to have given evidence to the Hutton inquiry. None of that evidence was given under oath, and I shall say more about that in a moment.
	Both Prime Minister Blair and the current Prime Minister try to claim that there have been numerous inquiries on this matter, such as the ones by the Foreign Affairs Committee, Butler and Hutton. Not one of those so-called "inquiries" was held under oath, and as a member of the FAC, I can say that extracting the truth was like extracting teeth from a whale. Every obstruction was put in our way. There were redactions in the report, as was mentioned earlier. The Butler inquiry was held behind closed doors, and we do not really know what evidence it received. We can look at the report, but no evidence was given under oath.
	I have said already that the Hutton inquiry was informal and non-statutory, albeit headed by a distinguished judge. No evidence was given under oath to that inquiry either, and our witness statements are covered by the 30-year rule. My humble little witness statement will not be seen for 30 years; neither will the witness statements of the Defence Secretary at the time, the right hon. Member for Ashfield (Mr. Hoon), or of the then Prime Minister, or of people in the security and intelligence services see the light of day—unless, of course, this new inquiry is independent and appointed under the tribunals of inquiry legislation.
	Of course, the establishment dare not do that, because all the documents seen by Hutton, Butler and the Foreign Affairs Committee would then be out in the open as documents before an independent inquiry. We know that there has been extensive dissembling—untruths told by a number of parties and agencies since the Iraq war and before it. We need to expose that and find out the motive for the dissembling, the misleading and the downright lies in some cases.
	Over the past few days, the Whips have come to me, saying that they do not want a Saville-type inquiry, as that one went on a long time and cost a lot of money. Actually, I do not want a Saville-type inquiry and I am not advocating such an inquiry, as it is not necessary. The Saville inquiry related to one traumatic and heart-rending incident, but in terms of the volume and level of deceit, the Iraq war is much bigger than the awful events in Londonderry a quarter of a century ago—I am not minimising what happened there, of course. Saville's was a judicial inquiry, at which people had to give evidence under oath, and the same was true of the Lawrence inquiry. If I may go back in history, Winston Churchill gave evidence under oath at the Gallipoli inquiry. Although that was a long time ago, it is the sort of inquiry that is required to deal with the Iraq war today.
	Why am I so upset by the Government trying to spin the yarn that, somehow, evidence can be given under what I think they say is the equivalent of an oath? That cannot be done and the Government know it. If I am wrong, let the Minister tell me where I am wrong when he replies to the debate. The fact is that the oath not only makes people tell the truth, but protects those who are being leaned on by superiors and other agencies. History would have been different if evidence had been given under oath to the Foreign Affairs Committee and, I believe, to the Hutton inquiry.
	I regret to say this, Madam Deputy Speaker, but the problem is the Prime Minister. The fact is that he does not understand that he does not understand. He came along last week to announce the inquiry and he handed it down like tablets of stone. What he basically said is, "We are the Government, so we decide." That simply will not do. Things have moved on since last week. We were told that it was going to be a Franks-style inquiry—quite wrongly, I think, for reasons I have explained—but it has now mutated into something completely different. The Prime Minister and, downwards from him, his advisers, were panicking, so he wrote to Chilcot and asked him to see what he could do about having some sessions in public, using what is said in their phrase to be some "equivalent to the oath". There is no equivalent to the oath; there would be more value in the wolf cub's promise than what they are proposing. That is the fact of the matter. There is no such equivalent to the oath and the Prime Minister knows it.  [Interruption.] If the Minister thinks I am wrong, I repeat my call for him to explain when he replies from the Dispatch Box what this equivalent is that will have the force of law and criminal sanctions if it were ever to be abrogated.
	As I have said, the Prime Minister does not understand that does not understand. The real test of all the stuff he has been saying about rejuvenating Parliament—he almost puts the blame on the rest of us for bringing Parliament into disrepute—is whether he is prepared to acknowledge that this Parliament has the right to decide the nature of the inquiry into why and how it was misled on the Iraq war. I am buttressed in my arguments by many of the people the Prime Minister relied on to say what a good idea a Franks-type inquiry would be. One after the other over the past seven days, those civil servants and members of the judiciary, for example, have said that that idea is nonsense. A few nights ago, I cheered when General Mike Jackson said on "Newsnight" that evidence to the inquiry must be given under oath. It showed that the Government cannot hide the fact that some military people who have seen the conflict and seen the evidence knew what was going on. They say this must be an independent inquiry and that evidence must be given under oath. Why does the Minister not understand that? Why does his boss the Prime Minister not understand that?
	It is time the Minister went behind the Chair and phoned the Prime Minister to tell him to accept the motion. If the Prime Minister does not do so, he may win the vote—I am not certain—but he will certainly lose the debate. The arguments for an independent inquiry will go on and on and on until one is conceded.

Geoffrey Cox: I have listened awestruck and impressed to the contributions made to the House today. I was not a Member of the House until 2005, and it is humbling to listen to the sincerity, passion and candour of those who lived through the experience of having to vote in the House on such a weighty and solemn a matter as sending our country to war. I have not had that responsibility, so it is with some trepidation but, I hope, a degree of humility that I offer my remarks about the motion on the inquiry that faces the House.
	I intended to confine my remarks to the structure, nature, procedure and terms of reference of the inquiry, and not to venture into the substantive aspects of the question relating to the merits of the war in Iraq, but inevitably the two are connected. Nobody can deny that the events and circumstances of the Iraq war were of the greatest magnitude in the history of our nation—far greater, I submit, than the events and circumstances of the Falklands war.
	One of the reasons I suggest the Iraq war is of greater magnitude is that it presents itself as a much greater and more complex series of questions and problems for the House and for history. It presents in that way because it raises much more fundamental questions, including questions of constitutional breakdown, as many Members have already said. How we came to the war includes the role of the Attorney-General and an analysis of how the Attorney-General interacts with the Government of the day. It includes complex questions of law, such as what was known to those who were advising the Government on the status of the war in international law. It raises questions of the House and its prerogatives, and of the accountability of the Government to the House. How can the House prevent itself from being—as some would say—deceived by evidence that has been exaggerated or distorted, when it cannot see the underlying documents?
	The Franks inquiry certainly never had to contend with the question of constitutional breakdown, because the Falklands war presented itself in a fairly simple light. There were questions about the defects in intelligence and, some might say, about a defect in the Government's conduct of policy running up to the war and the invasion by the Argentines, but what was never questioned—at least not by an overwhelming majority of the nation—was the justification for going to war in the Falklands islands in the first place. There was never a question of the constitutional processes by which that war had been undertaken.
	I recall as a young man listening to the wonderful debate in 1982 in which Michael Foot gave a great speech pledging his support and that of the Opposition for the vindication of those little islands and their population against the bullying of a larger nation that had taken international law into its own hands and made a mockery of it by invasion. The war we are dealing with in the inquiry raises much more fundamental questions and will have a much stronger effect on history than the war fought in 1982.
	It is precisely because of the multiplicity of aspects that the methods the Government have chosen to set up the inquiry are so fundamentally lacking. Let me explain. There are no terms of reference. Those we have seen, and which one can espy in the Prime Minister's statement, are non-existent. They have not been debated by the House. They have not been subject to the to and fro—the forensic testing and struggle—across the Floor of the House to ascertain and define precisely the instructions that the inquiry must follow. That is wrong and does not do justice to the complexity and gravity of the circumstances of the Iraq war because many of us might disagree about what central questions should be the focus of Sir John Chilcot's terms of reference. We cannot leave it to a bunch of civil servants, however distinguished they might be, to decide the fundamental questions to address.
	The hon. and learned Member for Medway (Mr. Marshall-Andrews) defined the central question as he saw it: how the House came to be deceived by a series of exaggerations and distortions. However, others might see the inquiry's central question as military unpreparedness and the Government sending our troops into war ill-equipped—and in many cases unequipped—for the kinds of warfare with which they had to contend. They are not the only considerations—others might see the aftermath of the war as the central question—but this House ought to decide the central questions for the inquiry and define the terms of reference. It is only through the democratic process of debate in the House about the terms of reference that the public can have any confidence that they have been established transparently and objectively.
	The motion in the name of my right hon. Friend the Leader of the Opposition says that the Government should
	"submit proposed terms of reference...to the House on a substantive motion for full debate and scrutiny."
	No other proposition can conceivably do justice to the gravity of the circumstances and the solemnity of the occasion with which we are confronted. I urge hon. Members on both sides of the Chamber to note the importance, as others have eloquently said, of the House taking back the right to say to the Executive, "This is our prerogative."
	I want to say something about the procedure. Historians are generally not especially experienced at interrogating live actors—I hope that that statement is pretty uncontroversial. I have no doubt that the two historians on the panel are especially good at interpreting historical documents and evidence, but I would be surprised if they had much experience of winkling out the truth from a reluctant and sometimes even self-deceived witness. There is one forensic tool—I would say this, and I declare an interest—that is guaranteed to winkle out the truth from a Minister or anybody else: cross-examination. Cross-examination by a skilled and experienced cross-examiner is an indefeasible tool in the hands of an inquiry. It is absurd—it is fantasy—to propose that creating the conditions of secrecy will somehow lead to a cosy, fireside chat in which the likes of Alastair Campbell will be induced to confide their secret heart to the listening committee. It is only with the forensic tool of cross-examination that we can hope to get the bottom of many of the complex and thorny issues with which the committee will be challenged.
	If the Government are to have cross-examination and to get to bottom of this, there has got to be an oath. It is no use suggesting, as the Foreign Secretary appeared to do at one point, that an oath can somehow be administered informally. If an oath is to mean anything, it must have legal consequences, and the legal consequences of telling a lie on oath are prosecution for perjury. If an oath is to be administered, it must be done in circumstances that leave no room for any doubt that telling a lie will be visited with all the penalties of the law, namely a prosecution for perjury. That is why I agree with the hon. Member for Thurrock (Andrew Mackinlay) that the only way is to have an oath. The only way is to have cross-examination. The only way is to have the inquiry in public when compelling interests of national security do not require otherwise. I say again that the only way is to have an inquiry that does justice to the gravity of the war, and to have a committee that includes men or women with experience, weight and wisdom in the relevant areas of this complicated issue.

Richard Shepherd: I agree with the burden of the arguments made by the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) and the arguments that have come from all quarters of the House.
	My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon (Mr. Cox) made a compelling case as to why he should be counsel to the inquiry. I know that his bag is full and his commitments are heavy, but he enunciated a principle that is at the heart of parliamentary democracy. This is a House of debate and of a Government making reasoned arguments and, by and large, trying to win an argument. We have seen chaos over recent weeks.
	My own dilemma has been reflected by others. I also voted for the war. That was against the advice of many friends in the defence industry, those who have some connections with intelligence, those who write for the newspapers, and colleagues in the House and elsewhere. Yet I disregarded their advice, because I was confronted with a Prime Minister who assured me that the war was necessary to the national interest. Why should I suspend my own judgment? I am normally the most critical of individuals. Why was I showing deference to a proposition put forward by a Prime Minister?
	I am old enough to remember Eden. When I was a boy in the combined cadet force at my school, we marched when Suez happened, to show our patriotic fervour. Within months, Eden was discredited and, unfortunately, health meant that he left for the country for a longish period. In Eden, we had a Prime Minister who lied to this House, according to Edward Heath, who in a broadcast said, "He knew he had made a lie on the Floor of the House over the events surrounding Suez." Mr. Heath was asked, "What did you do?" He replied, "Well, I got on with it, didn't I?" That is what has happened to this House: too many of us get on with it. That is our duty: to support the Government with whom we were elected or the party that, as a consequence of our election, becomes the Government.
	My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Torridge and West Devon is in my mind, but was is not Denning who said, "However mighty the citizen, the law is mightier still"? That is what is behind the construction of the proposition before us—constructed not by this House, incidentally, but by the Executive on the advice of Whitehall, presumably. The Government's proposition is designed to ensure that no one can be found culpable and suffer the consequences of—how shall we put it?—misadvising whatever committee comes into existence.
	Perjury is an awful threat, and the consequences of perjury are dramatic. A Cabinet Minister from this House perjured himself and went to prison. That is the jeopardy if anyone should mislead a properly founded inquiry with an oath sworn on it and the prospect of retribution if candour is not employed before its inquisitors. That concept is terribly important.
	We can see how the central question of the oath is dealt with on the Order Paper, and others have adequately referred to it. The Government's proposition is almost derisory. Its proposers, including the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, want
	"the chairman of the inquiry to consult party leaders and chairs of the relevant parliamentary committees on the scope for taking evidence".
	From the Order Paper, one of the central questions for the Secretary of State is: what is that "scope" for taking an oath? Ministers must have questioned, and been advised on, that central proposition, but earlier we saw the Foreign Secretary, in that wonderful, elegant and nonchalant way, dance away from the question—all the time. It was about the scope, and people should inquire, ask around and find out. The Government do not know? Of course they know. Those are the deceits that follow from propositions that are foisted upon this House by the Executive on the advice of Whitehall. I have no idea what the advice in Whitehall was, but I do not doubt that Whitehall would have asked itself the question and advised the Government that the decision about whether evidence would be on oath or not had implications.
	That is why this matter is a struggle for this Chamber—we, as elected representatives of the people, checking and holding to account a Government. Since I voted for the war, I have noted and shared some of the emotions of other Members. Events have moved on, and we have had the inquiry into the circumstances of the death of Dr. Kelly. What a revelation! There were all the e-mails. Who were they from? Alastair Campbell to John—now, Sir John—Scarlett, the head of intelligence. The Prime Minister's special adviser also said that the contents of one memorandum—the dodgy memorandum—did not seem to lead to the conclusion. What conclusion? The conclusion to go to war. It was altered. We know that from the Hutton inquiry and from the silence of the Foreign Office—the dog that did not bark in the night. There are no e-mails coming from the now Lord Chancellor—the lord high panjandrum—to inquire about intelligence. There is MI6, too. What about the Ministry of Defence, the Department at which the former Chief Whip of the Labour party was then Secretary of State? The defence intelligence unit was querying what the single source was.
	Here am I, having taken the word of a British Prime Minister, seeing unravel the very props with which I reinforced my vote. I want to know, in a proper and full inquiry, the circumstances surrounding how we went to war. I want to be able to reconcile in my mind the contradictions between, "I know nothing about the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr. Kelly," and, "I am responsible for all these matters." That was the then Prime Minister in front of Hutton and in conversation on an aeroplane. When I asked the then Prime Minister about the issue on the Floor of the House, he said, "Oh! We must wait until the outcome of the Hutton inquiry." Did Hutton answer the question? Did he reconcile the two seemingly contradictory statements? Not a bit of it.
	I want an inquiry, as does every Member who is really serious about the business of the House and our representative function. It should explicitly look into the matters of concern affecting a matter of great public policy—going to war. As the Prime Minister tolls out the lives of others who have been sent to Iraq, we are tolling our own bell. We need no servants to inquire; we should be the dynamic in the process of establishing the appropriate form for an inquiry.

Tobias Ellwood: The right hon. Lady is actually making my point for me. Whose responsibility is it to make peace? Is it the military's? The military provide the security on top of the hill. Something else has to happen in the village below, however, to ensure that the reconstruction takes place, that the schools are built and that the electricity is turned on—all the things that are involved in nation building. That is not the role of the military, although I would like it to be; rather, it was the responsibility of DFID. The right hon. Lady admitted to sending a diktat to the directors in her Department saying, "Do nothing. We're not even sure that this war is legal." I admire her consistency in the matter, but it does not help anybody in military uniform being sent over the start line by this Government then to realise that once the war fighting has stopped, we do not have a plan to keep the peace. That is where things went so pear-shaped.
	By 2004, the number of civilian deaths had risen to 20,000 a year and the number of UK military deaths had risen to 800 a year. By 2007, the situation had deteriorated so much that we had become part of the problem. We went from liberators to occupiers. A personal friend of mine who was leading 2nd Battalion the Rifles was made to leave Basra palace with his tail between his legs because he had become part of the problem. He had to return to the comfort of the air base, never to participate in proper patrolling again. Why? Because we did not have the plan for peace. That is the big lesson to be learned by the Government, but we do not need an inquiry to learn it. That is the point that I am stressing. I am afraid that we are making exactly the same mistakes in Afghanistan.
	It should not be that we spend three weeks war fighting and six years engaged in failed stabilisation. We must look at the type of warfare in which we are now involved. It is not called warfare anymore; it is counter-insurgency, and we must recognise that we are not very good at it. General Petraeus has said that it is no longer good enough simply to defeat the enemy; we have to go further and enable the local. Until we get that into our heads, we will continue to fail as we are doing.
	I stress that we cannot expect the military to do that work: they are not trained to do it, nor are they are equipped. We need a different type of equipment to do post-conflict stabilisation operations. As we have heard, DFID does not do that either. DFID does what it says on the tin: it tackles poverty. There is therefore a huge void that needs to be filled if we want not only to win wars, but to win the peace as well. At the moment, we are winning wars but losing the peacekeeping. Those are the lessons that we can learn without the need for an inquiry.
	I hope that the inquiry looks into what Whitehall did. I would like a huge overhaul of the way in which we approach post-conflict operations. It is no good trying to get soldiers to maintain a level of security when they see the demise of the infrastructure around them, with nobody willing to step forward and do the job. It is in that fragile window of opportunity—those few weeks to months after the war fighting has finished when the dust settles—that we want to win hearts and minds.

Tobias Ellwood: My hon. Friend makes such a valid point. That is the level of detail that needs to be looked at. It is not just the justice system that is important, however; it is the training of the police and the armed forces. Who is doing that now? Our armed forces are doing it, because of an absence of anybody else. Let us bite the bullet and recognise that our military are in the best place to do that. Our Royal Engineers are capable of making the roads and rebuilding the schools and so forth. They are capable of showing the locals that they mean business—that they want to help and then to go home. They do not want to hang round in a conflict zone for six years and watch the security situation deteriorate.
	What happened in Iraq was appalling, and I am afraid that Whitehall should take the blame for that. As the security situation deteriorated, because nobody bothered to try to fill the power vacuum, who came into Iraq? Al-Qaeda did, making its home there and making the job of providing security all the more tough. Those are the lessons. Do we need an inquiry? Yes, of course, it would help; but boy, we could have learned those lessons many moons ago. I am pleased to see the Secretary of State for Defence in the Chamber now. I stress that we need to wake up to our capability and to what we are doing. The Americans have done so, but we have not. Until we do so, we will struggle to win these campaigns after the war fighting has finished.
	In the long history of British engagements, Iraq was far from being our finest hour. That was no fault of our armed forces, who can hold their heads up high. The blame falls squarely on Whitehall, which failed to plan for peace. We cannot totally blame the Americans. I am now aware that Colin Powell had 15 737s on the runway with all the reconstruction gear and an army of civil servants, but Basra was our responsibility and we failed to make the effort to make the reconstruction work.
	I hope that the inquiry will exonerate our military forces of mismanaging the peace. They are feeling the blame at the moment and, although they cannot say so publicly, they are deeply angry about the demise of the security situation, supposedly on their watch. I hope that these blatant errors will be recognised and acknowledged by the inquiry so that lessons can be learned, although I am afraid that some of the errors are already being repeated in Afghanistan. There is a gaping hole in our post-conflict stabilisation capability, and I hope that the inquiry will expedite a desire to fix it.

Jeremy Corbyn: I have been present at virtually every debate on Iraq for the past seven years. I never thought that, seven years on we would still be debating the legality of, and responsibility for, the war, and how to conduct a proper investigation into it. The image of Parliament has suffered enormously over the past few weeks—nay, the past few months. If we fudge this issue tonight and decline to hold the kind of open, public, legally based, oath-taking, subpoenaed inquiry that is required, yes, there will be a report—some kind of bowdlerised version of what happened will be produced by a group of Privy Counsellors, and everyone will go away and say, "That's fine"—but the demand for an inquiry will still be there, culpability will still be sought and the responsibility will still rest on those people who took us into the conflict. Fudging the issue tonight will merely delay the debate until another day, and another day after that.
	I was one of those who helped to organise the massive demonstration in 2003, and I have attended hundreds of meetings all over the country against the invasion of Iraq and the legality of the war. The 1 million and more people who came to London on that day in 2003—and the millions more around the country who attended local demonstrations, wrote to their MPs, sent e-mails, signed petitions or simply expressed an opinion against the war—felt very let down by Parliament on that occasion. They also felt very let down by the political system, and a whole generation of young people have now been radicalised to question the effectiveness of this place and to wonder what is the point of a political system that can take us into a war that turns out to be illegal and then blinker its eyes to the consequences. We need to take some serious decisions tonight.

Bill Rammell: We have had an exceedingly good debate. It clear that Members in all parts of the House have genuine concerns and convictions on this subject, whatever view they take.
	Earlier today, my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary set out—rightly, in my view—why we are having an inquiry into the Iraq war and why we believe that Sir John Chilcot and his committee have the remit, the support and the authority to fulfil that objective. Let me be clear: if we are serious about learning lessons from the Iraq war, we need an independent, strategic review to be conducted with full access to Government documents—

William Hague: Can we be absolutely clear, for the avoidance of all further doubt, that the Prime Minister's statement, quoted by a moment ago by the hon. Member for Somerton and Frome (Mr. Heath), that the inquiry would not set out to apportion blame is no longer operative and no longer part of Government policy?

Bill Rammell: Over the past 10 days, we have genuinely listened to the views and criticisms expressed. We have rightly moved, and Members now have opportunity to make a judgment on that. That is why we are having a vote, and I urge Members to do so.
	The right hon. and learned Member for Kensington and Chelsea (Sir Malcolm Rifkind) said that we did not consult the armed forces. That is emphatically not true. The Chief of the Defence Staff, as the head of the armed forces, was consulted and was content with the form of the inquiry.

Brian Binley: The debate provides me with an opportunity— [Interruption.] After you have been congratulated again by the Members who are at the Chair, Mr. Speaker, the debate provides me with the opportunity to wish you well. I understand the congratulations, and I wish you well in your very difficult task and recognise the courage that you have displayed in taking it on. My job tonight, however, is to talk about assaults on taxi drivers and the need to protect them further than we might have done so far.
	I set the scene by pointing out that violence against taxi drivers has increased sizeably over the past decade. To be fair to the Government, they have recognised that on a number of occasions. I might add, however, that the increase is linked—there is now some evidence of the linkage—with the rise in late-night drinking in our major town centres, given the unsociable hours that taxi drivers work and the fact that people come out of clubs at 3 or 4 o'clock in the morning and then spend perhaps another half an hour in the kebab house before seeking a taxi. Those two factors are important in the increase in violence.
	I do not need to tell the Minister about the vital importance of taxis to the transport industry. However, that importance is not well understood by many in local government. For instance, five or six years ago, Northamptonshire county council undertook a multi-modal study costing some £750,000. It might surprise the Minister to know that taxis were not included in that study, yet we are talking about an industry that employs 340,000 people. The latest figures to hand show that there are 71,500 Hackney cab drivers and more than 250,000 private-hire drivers. The industry makes about 700 million taxi journeys a year, which means an average of roughly 11 journeys for each member of the population. About £3 billion is spent on fares each year. We are therefore talking about a sizeable industry that plays a major role in our public transportation. It is important to recognise that.
	I do not need to tell the Minister that taxi drivers are often alone with their customers in their cabs, and are therefore highly vulnerable. We need to bear that in mind quite seriously. Taxi drivers work on the front line of transportation and in the late hours, not least because no other transportation is available then. Their customers are unknown to them and they often pick them up in the very dimmest of light. Whereas the Minister and I might be able to spot an undesirable customer in the light of day, it is difficult for taxi drivers to do that.
	Taxi drivers also take home groups of more than one person. Late at night, their customers are often the worse for drink. Those are difficult circumstances for any service provider to deal with customers in. Taxi drivers carry out a vital function in some of the most difficult circumstances that we might imagine, and they pay a price. Taxi drivers are under attack. The figures are not only clear; they are quite horrifying. There were 51 murders in the private-hire and Hackney cab industry over a 15-year period, which means an average of a little over three a year. That is a frightening figure in an industry that is about providing a service during antisocial hours to a customer base that often has no alternative. In truth, that might be a comment on our society, although it is not my purpose to talk about that this evening.
	Let me give some examples of taxi drivers who were murdered. In May 2006, 37-year-old Mahmood Ahmed, a family man, was found stabbed to death in a country lane in Keighley. The post-mortem revealed that he had been hit hard on the head with a blunt instrument from behind—that is an important fact. In May 2007, in Gravesham, Kent, a 70-year-old grandfather, Gian Chand Bajar, was attacked and had the proceeds of that evening's work stolen. The attackers then took his taxi by force, ran over him and left him to die in the street. He died in hospital, and his car was found abandoned, having been set on fire, a mile from the site of the attack. In 2005, Mr. Colin Winstone, aged 44 and from Bristol, was found dead after being stabbed outside the Old Fox Inn at Easton, Bristol. Those three cases illuminate the fact that these are family people doing an important job, who meet a violent end that horrifies us all.
	In addition to murders, there are thousands of attacks. Only last month in the Halifax area, a taxi driver named Amjad Farooq, aged 35, was violently attacked. He sustained serious head injuries, was beaten unconscious, had his car stolen and was hospitalised for a considerable time. In June 2009—only this month—another driver, whose name I was unable to get, was robbed at knifepoint by three men in Burnage, Manchester. In November 2008, another taxi driver recovered at home after being struck over the head with what was believed to have been a handgun. He was attacked by two men in Normanton, Derby, who then drove off in his taxi.
	Those are just three examples—six altogether, including the murders that I have mentioned—of the thousands of incidents that are inflicted on taxi drivers every year. I would like to make the point that race is a major factor in this issue. Although only one third of the trade's drivers are from our ethnic minority communities, two thirds of the attacks are on people from those communities. I know that the Minister does not need me to underline that point to him, as he is aware of it and understands the horror of that aspect of these crimes.
	Sadly, taxi drivers lack faith in justice system, and many attacks are not reported. A survey carried out in Portsmouth in 2008 showed that, of the 396 drivers who responded, 60 per cent. had been a victim of crime in the past 12 months. It also showed that 70 per cent. admitted not reporting incidents to the police, and that the most common reason for that was that they did not think the police would be interested. We need to take that on board. Rightly or wrongly, that is the general impression that people have, and we have to deal with that. We cannot afford to have a sizeable part of our community believing that the police are not interested. Action needs to be taken in that regard.
	As I have said, taxi drivers do not have faith in the justice system. Equally, the evidence suggests that, in certain parts of the country, the relationship between police and taxi drivers is simply not good enough. That is a pretty disturbing indictment, yet that is what the evidence shows. I fear that we are not in a position to refute it, but we are in a position to try to do something about it.
	The cost to the nation of dealing with attacks on taxi drivers is remarkably high. The estimated cost of investigating the 51 murders over 15 years was £77.7 million. The cost of each investigation of violence against a person in relation to taxi drivers was £3,036 for each attack. That is quite a lot of money but, bearing in mind the crime, it is a price that we have to pay. It is, however, a price that we would wish not to pay. I know that the Minister feels the same. If we add social security and loss of earnings, the total cost to the country over those 15 years is sizeable. I have been given a figure, but I think that it is a mistake, so I shall not read it out, because I do not want it to go on the record. A sizeable amount is involved, nevertheless, and we need to take that into account.
	There is action that we can take to help taxi drivers. There is a need for automatic protection between taxi drivers and their customers. That means screens in hire cars. Screens could be purchased to stop attacks from the rear, which is where many attacks emanate from in non-Hackney cab taxis. There would be a double benefit because, sadly, there are reports of unwanted sexual approaches made to young ladies late in the night and screens would stop that happening. There are good social reasons to encourage a simple answer for authorities that give licences to taxi cabs, and it would be easy to introduce a requirement to ensure that screens were fitted in non-Hackney taxi cabs—if we were willing to do so.
	In March, Mr. Bryan Roland, general secretary of the Private Hire Association, fully endorsed in an open letter Safe Shield or shield-type products in cabs for those very reasons. However, and surprisingly, some councils will not permit the use of screens. That is quite remarkable. The Minister looks quizzical, but that is the information I have. I will write to him about it, although I am glad that he was as surprised as I was when I learned of it.
	Screens are an aid to cutting violence against taxi drivers, as is CCTV. In Sheffield, a local taxi company had problems with assaults on its drivers. Over Christmas 2006, it suffered 400 incidents of violence. It was so worried that it paid for in-car cameras—an expensive exercise. The result? In 2007, only six incidents occurred. What a tremendous deterrent and a 98.5 per cent. reduction on the previous year thanks to CCTV. In Blackburn, Lancashire, there were 140 crimes—one for every five such vehicles on the road. Fourteen cars were fitted with CCTV equipment as part of a pilot scheme, with council help. That increased security for drivers and passengers.
	There are ways to deal with these problems, therefore, and the London Taxi Network is another. The Minister will know that 4,500 London taxi drivers signed up to Dial-a-Cab and Radio Taxis Group, which provided enhanced security. I could go on. He will also know about the Taxi Marshals scheme. It is another way in which local authorities in particular can help in this respect.
	I bring your attention, Mr. Speaker, to an Adjournment debate that I held on this very subject on 1 May 2008. On the point about CCTV, I said:
	"There are problems, however. The units cost between £700 and £1,000 a car, and we know that most taxi drivers are self-employed and do not have that sort of capital. I am told that the cost of production is only £80 and that the rest is maintenance and back-up."—[ Official Report, 1 May 2008; Vol. 475, c. 547.]
	I asked whether the Government would look into that. I did not receive an answer at the time, so I hope the Minister can come back with information that would be encouraging to taxi drivers vis-à-vis the cost and perhaps with ways that we can help to encourage the purchase of CCTV cameras.
	A year ago, I asked the Minister who responded to the debate about local authorities encouraging the use of screens. It might almost be in the Government's thinking to say that screens ought to be fitted as a basic requirement in non-Hackney cab taxis. Will this Minister be kind enough to come back to me on that issue?
	I ask the Minister to consider ways to improve relationships between taxi drivers and the police, if only to get rid of the perception among taxi drivers that the police do not care. Perhaps the police could do a little more to protect both the safety of taxicab customers and, equally important, that of their drivers.
	As I said at the beginning of my speech, I feel that the Government have a responsibility. The drinking laws changed, and the House quite properly accepted that, but that change has had results with which most other people must be unhappy. We must address the side-effects of the increasing late-night drinking in our towns and cities, which has led to more attacks on taxis.
	I believe that taxi drivers seek real and meaningful answers and, perhaps, action from the Government. I hope that the Government will be able to give us some reassurance, and give the taxi drivers who serve our community in such an important way a little confidence that we may do a bit more to minimise a problem that is clearly of great import to their industry.